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NOTE
THE TAX INJUNCTION ACT AND FEDERAL
JURISDICTION: REASONING FROM THE UNDERLYING
GOALS OF FEDERALISM AND COMITY
David Fautsch*
States routinely contest federal jurisdiction when a state tax is chal-
lenged in federal district court on federal constitutional grounds.
States argue that the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006),
bars jurisdiction and, even if the Tax Injunction Act does not apply,
the principals of federalism and comity require abstention. The
United States Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the scope
of federalism and comity in relation to the Tax Injunction Act, and
federal courts of appeal are split. In the Fourth and Tenth Circuits,
federalism and comity require federal district courts to abstain even
where the Tax Injunction Act permits jurisdiction. In the First,
Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, however, federalism and comity reach
no further than the Tax Injunction Act.
This Note (1) discusses the circuit split, (2) provides a framework
for analyzing the federal judiciary's role in constitutional litigation
involving state interests, and (3) resolves the circuit split by arguing
that federalism concerns do not justify abstention and that comity
concerns, in extreme cases, may justify abstention.
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The forum in which a case is heard, federal or state court, can signifi-
cantly affect the outcome of litigation, and litigants often fight hard to
obtain their preferred forum.3 Plaintiffs raising constitutional law claims, in
particular, often choose between state and federal court based on their per-
ception of which court will be most receptive to their claims. The stakes are
high in the fight over whether a state or federal court has jurisdiction, be-
cause the first court system to hear the case will likely be the last.' Justice
Frankfurter's recognition that freedom and procedure are deeply intertwined
is, therefore, especially true for plaintiffs raising constitutional claims-
determining whether a state or federal court has jurisdiction is a crucial de-
6
cision that can have far-reaching ramifications.
1. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401,414 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
2. Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary,
36 UCLA L. REV. 233 (1988) (discussing the debate on whether federal and state courts vindicate
federal rights to the same extent).
3. Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977).
4. See, e.g., id. at 1108-09 (noting that civil rights litigants have historically sought to
expand federal jurisdiction for civil rights claims); William B. Rubenstein, The Myth of Superiority,
16 CONST. COMMENT. 599, 606-11 (1999) (noting that state courts are the preferred forum for most
gay-rights litigants).
5. Scholars and practitioners routinely note that litigation is expensive and time consum-
ing. See, e.g., Kathleen K. Wright, Using Retroactive Taxes to Cure Budget Shortfalls, 61 TAX LAW.
1153, 1179 (2008) ("Litigation is expensive and limiting any recovery discourages taxpayers from
challenging unconstitutional assessments."). Furthermore, the high cost of continuing to litigate may
be too much for some plaintiffs to bear. Shira A. Scheindlin & John Elofson, Judges, Juries, and
Sexual Harassment, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 813, 844 (1999) ("[A]n appeal is another significant
expense, and it is likely that neither the plaintiff nor her attorney can afford to press the appeal.").
6. See Neubome, supra note 3, at 1106 ("During the past century, litigators have consis-
tently advanced ostensibly outcome-neutral federalism arguments, assertedly unrelated to the merits,
to channel constitutional adjudication into forums calculated to advance the substantive interests of
their clients.").
The Tax Injunction Act
Suits involving the constitutionality of state tax schemes exemplify the
procedural battle over whether the appropriate court of first instance is state
or federal. Assume, for example, that a state decides that families who send
their children to private schools should not pay the full price for a public
school system that they are not using. This hypothetical state, therefore, en-
acts legislation to provide a tax credit for parents who send their children to
private schools.7 The tax credit allows families to deduct a portion of the
expense of sending their children to private school, but the absolute most
that a single family can avoid paying in taxes is $2000. Each family's exact
tax savings is determined by a formula that takes into account the number of
children attending school, the cost of the private school, and the cost of pub-
lic education in that family's particular community.
The legislative history and public debate around the new tax-credit pro-
gram does not reveal an invidious purpose to discriminate against any
protected class. Nor is there any evidence of intent to create or maintain ra-
cial segregation. The state has done substantial planning to forecast tax
revenues, and it claims that the quality of public education will not dimin-
ish. According to the state, the decrease in tax revenue will be offset by the
decrease in students attending public schools.
Despite the state's claims, a class of plaintiffs seeks to invalidate the tax
credit. The plaintiffs argue that public education is suffering-especially in
minority communities-and that public education will become even worse
if the state is allowed to continue this tax credit. The plaintiffs argue that the
state tax credit violates the First Amendment's Establishment Clause (many
of the private schools are religious) and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause. The plaintiffs file a complaint against the state in the lo-
cal federal district court. The state responds that the federal district court
lacks jurisdiction by virtue of the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341, 9
and, even if § 1341 does not apply, that notions of federalism and comity
require the federal court to abstain.'
Section 1341 reads, "The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or re-
strain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a
plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.""
Thus, if § 1341 applies, federal district courts do not have jurisdiction.' 2
7. This hypothetical draws loosely on the facts of two recent cases: Hibbs v. Winn, 542
U.S. 88 (2004) and Lynch ex rel. Lynch v. Alabama, 568 F. Supp. 2d 1329 (N.D. Ala. 2008).
8. In the wake of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), tuition grants and
tax credits were one means of circumventing federally mandated desegregation efforts. Hibbs, 542
U.S. at 93; see also Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (holding that a federal dis-
trict court may require a county to levy taxes to combat an unconstitutional closure of public schools
resulting from tuition grants and tax credits for contributions to private segregated schools).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006).
10. This is a common defense in cases like the hypothetical. See infra Part I.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1341.
12. By its terms, § 1341 deprives the federal district courts of jurisdiction so that jurisdic-
tion is not discretionary. Id. Federalism and comity, on the other hand, are concepts that may require
courts to abstain from hearing a case. Abstention is "[a] federal court's relinquishment of
March 2010]
Michigan Law Review
Regardless of § 1341, however, federal district courts may invoke federalism
and comity to justify abstention when litigation involves sensitive state in-
terests. 3 Federalism, which describes the balance of power between the
states and the federal government, is sometimes simply articulated as "Our
Federalism.' 4 Comity, which describes the recognition that federal courts
give to official acts of a state government, is often listed as a justification for
abstention when a federal court judgment might create hostility between the
state and the federal government. 5
Supreme Court jurisprudence does not definitively resolve whether the
federal district court should exercise jurisdiction or abstain. In Fair Assess-
ment in Real Estate Association v. McNary, the Court held that the principle
of comity required federal district courts to abstain from taxpayer suits
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 regardless of whether § 1341 applied. 6 Al-
though the Court was asked to consider the effect of § 1341 in Fair
Assessment, the Court specifically found that because "the principle of com-
ity bars federal courts from granting damages relief in such cases, we do not
decide whether [§ 1341], standing alone, would require such a result."'7 In
jurisdiction when necessary to avoid needless conflict with a state's administration of its own af-
fairs." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 9 (9th ed. 2009). Therefore, when deciding whether to abstain
based on federalism and comity concerns, the federal district courts have jurisdiction but use their
discretion to avoid adjudicating the case.
13. See, e.g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 243 (1972) ("[W]e do not question or
qualify in any way the principles of equity, comity, and federalism that must restrain a federal court
when asked to enjoin a state court proceeding."); see also Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462
(1974) ("When no state proceeding is pending and thus considerations of equity, comity, and feder-
alism have little vitality, the propriety of granting federal declaratory relief may properly be
considered independently of a request for injunctive relief."). Federalism and comity, however, are
distinct concepts. Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA 's Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and Federalism, 82 TuL. L.
REV. 443, 457 (2007) ("I have been unable to locate a habeas decision that carefully parses comity
and federalism interests. The two terms describe different phenomena, but comity is by far the more
clearly and frequently articulated interest."). The key difference between these two concepts appears
to be that comity is a doctrine of equity, whereas federalism is an organizing principle unique to the
government of the United States. Compare Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454
U.S. 100, 119 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring) (describing comity as an equitable doctrine), with
Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 312-13 (describing federalism as a principle relating to the structure
of govemment).
14. Federalism is "[tihe legal relationship and distribution of power between the national
and regional governments within a federal system of government." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY,
supra note 12, at 687. In the context of federal court abstention, however, federalism is often meant
to convey the concept of "Our Federalism." See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). "Our
Federalism" is defined as "[t]he doctrine holding that a federal court must refrain from hearing a
constitutional challenge to state action if federal adjudication would be considered an improper
intrusion into the state's right to enforce its own laws in its own courts." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY,
supra note 12, at 1211.
15. Comity is "[a] practice among political entities (as nations, states, or courts of different
jurisdictions), involving esp. mutual recognition of legislative, executive, and judicial acts." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 12, at 303.
16. 454 U.S. at 107.
17. Fair Assessment, 454 U.S. at 107. Although the Fair Assessment Court used the term
"bar" (which connotes a sense of permanence) to describe its holding, federal courts are not forever
restrained from hearing constitutional challenges to state tax schemes. Id. at 116 (recognizing that
constitutional plaintiffs "may ultimately seek review of the state decisions in this Court"). Thus,
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Hibbs v. Winn, the Court held that § 1341 permits jurisdiction where the
relief requested by the plaintiff would result in an increase in the state's tax18
revenue. The Hibbs Court did not address whether federalism or comity
could require federal courts to abstain even when § 1341 permits jurisdic-
tion." Moreover, the three dissenters, led by Justice Kennedy, did not
specifically argue that comity required abstention. 0 Thus, the Supreme
Court has not addressed whether federalism or comity can require a federal
court to abstain when § 1341 clearly permits federal jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court's failure to address the effect of federalism and
comity in the context of § 1341 opened the door for conflict between the
federal courts of appeal.2 The Fourth and Tenth Circuits hold that federal-
ism and comity reach beyond § 1341. Thus, in these Circuits, courts may
abstain even in cases where Hibbs clearly indicates that § 1341 does not
apply. The First, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, on the other hand, hold that
federalism and comity reach no further than § 1341. Thus, in these Circuits,
if § 1341 does not bar jurisdiction, neither federalism nor comity is a justifi-
cation for abstention.
Resolving this circuit split requires courts to answer the following ques-
tion: where a plaintiff seeks relief from the federal courts for an allegedly
unconstitutional state tax scheme, and § 1341 does not bar the plaintiff's
claim, can general principles of federalism or comity still require federal
courts to abstain? The resolution of this circuit split is important for at least
two reasons. First, litigants and courts involved in suits challenging the con-
stitutionality of state tax schemes need to know where the case properly
belongs. If ambiguity persists, similarly situated litigants will be treated dif-
ferently depending on where their case arises. That is to say, litigants in
certain circuits will be required to litigate in state court while litigants in
other circuits will be allowed to litigate in federal court. Second, the way
this question is resolved has implications for how federal courts define and
22reason about their relationship to state courts. Federal judges, scholars,
and practitioners continually note that the limited jurisdiction of the fed-
eral judiciary is constantly evolving and not always articulated by bright
federal appellate courts retain the right to adjudicate federal constitutional issues once the state court
system has adjudicated the case.
18. Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 108 (2004) ("[Section] 1341 has been read to restrain
state taxpayers from instituting federal actions to contest their liability for state taxes, but not to stop
third parties from pursuing constitutional challenges to state tax benefits in a federal forum.").
19. The Hibbs Court cites, but does not discuss, Fair Assessment for the proposition that
the Court has refused jurisdiction in cases where the relief requested by the plaintiff would decrease
state tax revenue. Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 106. The Fair Assessment Court, however, rested its decision
squarely on the notion of comity. 454 U.S. at 107.
20. Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 124 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy, rather, focused on
the interpretation of § 1341, and only briefly mentioned Fair Assessment. Id.
21. See infra Section I.B.
22. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV.
1141, 1145-46 (1988) (noting the complex debate over the constitutional, statutory, and common
law issues implicated by federalism).
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line rules.23 Where case law is not dispositive, as in these kinds of cases,
judgments about the appropriate scope of federal judicial power are inevita-
ble.24 The appropriate resolution of this question is all the more important
given that the Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to a case from the
Sixth Circuit to consider the same issues addressed by this Note: (1)
whether Hibbs narrowed the doctrine of comity applied in Fair Assessment,
and (2) whether comity principles bar federal jurisdiction in the instant case.
This Note provides a framework for analyzing the federal judiciary's
role in constitutional litigation involving sensitive state interests, and argues
that federalism concerns do not justify abstention, and that comity concerns,
in extreme cases, may justify abstention.
Part I discusses the history of § 1341 and the Supreme Court's conflict-
ing interpretations in Fair Assessment and Hibbs, as well as outlines the
recent circuit split that is rooted in these two cases. Part II notes the failure
of the federal appeals courts to explain how the underlying goals of federal-
ism and comity factor into the decision to exercise jurisdiction or abstain,
and argues that § 1341 (as interpreted in Hibbs) defines the limits of federal
jurisdiction in most cases. That is to say, as long as the relief requested by
the plaintiff would increase state tax revenue, federal courts are not limited
by § 1341, federalism, or comity. In extreme cases, however, comity (but not
federalism) justifies federal-court abstention. An extreme case would be one
in which the relief requested by the plaintiff might ultimately increase state
tax revenue but would require the state to drastically overhaul its tax system.
The federal appeals courts have not yet dealt with such an extreme case.
I. THE HISTORY OF § 1341 AND CONFLICTING
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS
The relationship between § 1341, federalism, and comity is complex and
long standing. Section L.A provides a brief overview of the legislative his-
tory, text, and interpretation of § 1341. This overview demonstrates how
§ 1341 already addresses comity and federalism concerns. Section L.A also
argues that the Supreme Court's decisions in Fair Assessment and Hibbs led
the federal circuits to ask whether federalism and comity can require federal
courts to abstain irrespective of § 1341. In other words, the Supreme Court
has not squarely resolved the limits of federalism and comity in suits chal-
lenging the constitutionality of state taxes. Finally, Section I.B establishes
that the federal circuits have differed over the reach of federalism and com-
ity without meaningfully explaining how the decision to exercise
jurisdiction or abstain implicates the underlying goals of these concepts.
23. See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law,
39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383, 394-95 (1964) (discussing the evolving nature of federal court jurisdiction).
24. See, e.g., Neuborne, supra note 3, at 1105-06.
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A. The Tax Injunction Act, Fair Assessment and Hibbs
1. Congress Designed the Tax Injunction Act to Address
Federalism and Comity Concerns
Section 1341, the Tax Injunction Act, reads, "The district courts shall
not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax
under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in
the courts of such State."25 Several observations about the mechanics of
§ 1341 help provide context. First, § 1341 permits federal jurisdiction if a
state fails to provide an adequate process for plaintiffs to contest the validity
26
of a tax. In the context of § 1341, no federal court has held that a state's
court system is incapable of supplying a constitutional plaintiff with a plain,
speedy, and efficient remedy.27 Second, the term "tax" is defined by federal
law, not state law.2' Third, § 1341 applies to all types of challenges to state
taxes, 29 but, for the purposes of this Note, only federal constitutional chal-
lenges are considered.3 °
The legislative history of § 1341 reveals that Congress intended to re-
solve tension between state and federal interests. First, Congress sought to
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006).
26. See Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, What Constitutes Plain, Speedy, and Efficient State
Remedy Under Tax Injunction Act (28 U.S.C.A. § 1341), Prohibiting Federal District Courts from
Interfering with Assessment, Levy, or Collection of State Business Taxes, 31 A.L.R. FED. 2D 237,
253 (2008).
27. See id. (discussing cases where federal courts evaluated whether existing state court
procedures provided plain, speedy, and efficient remedies within the meaning of § 1341, none of
which considered the possibility that a state's court system was unable to provide such a remedy).
Whether state courts adequately adjudicate federal constitutional rights is the subject of substantial
debate. See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 605 (1981); Chemerinsky, supra note 2; Neubome, supra note 3; Rubenstein, supra
note 4; Michael E. Solomine & James L. Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State
Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 213 (1982).
The parity debate is obviously beyond the scope of this Note, but questions of parity are deep-
ly embedded in the legitimacy of comity and, especially, federalism. See infra Section II.A. Indeed,
Justice Kennedy identifies parity as an underlying motivator of the Court's decision in Hibbs. In his
dissent, Justice Kennedy writes, "The concem, it seems, is that state courts are second rate constitu-
tional arbiters, unequal to their federal counterparts. State courts are due more respect than this."
Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 113 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
28. Wright v. McClain, 835 F.2d 143, 144 (6th Cir. 1987); Robinson Protective Alarm Co.
v. City of Phila., 581 F.2d 371, 374-76 (3d Cir. 1978); Tramel v. Schrader, 505 F.2d 1310, 1315 &
n.7 (5th Cir. 1975).
29. See generally Andrew M. Campbell, Annotation, What constitutes "tax" under Tax
Injunction Act (28 U.S.C.A. § 1341), which prohibits federal district courts from interfering with
assessment, levy, or collection of state taxes, 151 A.L.R. FED. 387 (1999) (noting that the Tax In-
junction Act applies to all challenges to state tax laws, not just constitutional challenges).
30. Section 1341 does not, on its face, distinguish between plaintiffs who are actually
subject to the tax that they are challenging, and plaintiffs that are challenging tax benefits given to
third parties. Hibbs holds, however, that § 1341 does not apply to third parties challenging tax bene-
fits given to other people or entities. 542 U.S. at 108-12. For the purposes of this Note, as outlined




limit the impact of Ex Parte Young,3' which held that a state Attorney Gen-
eral could be held in contempt of court for violating a federal injunction."
Ex Parte Young was a watershed case because it exposed state officers to
scrutiny from the federal courts-it brought "within the scope of federal
judicial review actions that otherwise might escape review, and [subjected]
the states to the restrictions of the United States Constitution that they oth-
erwise might be able safely to ignore."33
Second, Congress was concerned that the use of diversity jurisdiction
gave out-of-state plaintiffs an unfair business advantage by permitting out-
of-state plaintiffs to delay payment of state taxes during the course of litiga-
tion in federal court.34 Congress feared a situation in which out-of-state
plaintiffs could bring suit in federal court through diversity jurisdiction and
withhold taxes during litigation," whereas in-state plaintiffs would be re-
36quired to pay first and then litigate in state court.
Third, Congress did not want federal courts to disrupt the administration
of state tax systems.37 Congress was concerned that litigation can render
future revenue difficult to predict, and thus hamper the ability of states to
create a budget."
Courts have differed about the exact contours of the third purpose: the
degree to which federal courts may complicate state budget making. In
Hibbs, for example, Justices Ginsburg and Kennedy differed sharply over
how robustly Congress intended to protect state budgets from scrutiny in the
federal courts. Justice Ginsburg found that § 1341 does not apply when the
proposed relief would increase state tax revenues.39 Quoting Judge Easter-
brook, the Court recognized that "[tihere was no articulated concern about
31. Frederick C. Lowinger, Comment, The Tax Injunction Act and Suits for Monetary
Relief, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 736, 739-40 (1979).
32. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
33. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 48, at 312
(6th ed. 2002).
34. See H.R. REP. No. 75-1503, at 2 (1937) (incorporating S. REP. No. 75-1035 (1937)); S.
REP. No. 75-1035, at 1-2; 81 CONG. REC. 1416 (1937).
35. Garrett v. Bamford, 538 F.2d 63, 67 (3d Cir. 1976) ("Congress' apparent concern to
limit the ability of foreign corporations to use the diversity jurisdiction, at least suggests that Con-
gress did not intend the Tax Injunction Act to bar federal courts from entertaining challenges to state
taxes when such challenges were based on federal law."). Prior to the Tax Injunction Act, federal
courts permitted out-of-state plaintiffs to sue in diversity and to stay payment on their taxes during
the course of the litigation. Id. at 66. Recognizing that this created an incentive to litigate in federal
court and a business advantage to out-of-state corporations, Congress sought to end this practice
through the Tax Injunction Act. Id.
36. Id. at 66.
37. See H.R. REP. No. 75-1503, at 2 (noting inter alia that through litigating in federal
courts, foreign corporations can withhold taxes "in such vast amounts and for such long periods of
time as to seriously disrupt State and county finances" (quoting S. REP. No. 75-1035, at 2)).
38. See Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 127 n.17 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) ("If federal declaratory relief were available to test state tax assessments, state tax
administration might be thrown into disarray, and taxpayers might escape the ordinary procedural
requirements imposed by state law.").
39. Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 108-12 (2004).
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federal courts' flogging state and local governments to collect additional
taxes. 40 Justice Kennedy, writing for the dissent, construed the legislative
history more broadly: "The Court has made clear that [§ 1341]'s purpose is
not only to protect the fisc but also to protect the State's tax system admini-
stration and tax policy implementation."4' Justice Kennedy, therefore, would
find that even if the plaintiff's relief would increase state tax revenue,
§ 1341 should still bar jurisdiction because Congress intended to stop fed-
42eral courts from interfering with state tax systems.
The legislative history of § 1341 clearly indicates that Congress sought
to protect state interests from federal scrutiny. The Supreme Court, however,
complicated the question. By failing to address whether the general princi-
ples of federalism or comity can require federal courts to abstain, even
where § 1341 permits federal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court opened the
door to conflicting interpretations of federal jurisdiction over challenges to
state tax schemes.
2. The Supreme Court Opened the Door for Conflicting Interpretations
of the Tax Injunction Act in Fair Assessment and Hibbs
In Fair Assessment, the Supreme Court held that the principle of comity
bars federal district court jurisdiction over suits "to redress the allegedly
unconstitutional administration of a state tax system.' 43 A group of plaintiffs
complained that Missouri imposed a higher tax on their recently renovated
homes than on homes that were not recently improved. 44 By systematically
taxing recently improved homes at a higher rate, the plaintiffs argued, Mis-
souri violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 45 The plaintiffs initially filed their case in state trial
46court. Although the plaintiffs prevailed in the trial court, the Missouri Su-
preme Court reversed and held that the State Tax Commission, not the trial
court, was the proper venue.47 While the case was being heard in front of the
State Tax Commission, the plaintiffs filed a § 1983 suit in federal district
court to enforce their Fourteenth Amendment rights.48
Missouri argued that § 1341 and comity required the plaintiffs to litigate
in state court, and both the federal district court and the Eighth Circuit
40. Id. at 109 (quoting Dunn v. Carey, 808 F2d 555, 558 (7th Cir. 1986)).
41. Id. at 123 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
42. See id. at 122-23.
43. Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 101 (1981).
44. Id. at 106.
45. Id. at 105-06.
46. Id. at 106.
47. State ex rel. Cassilly v. Riney, 576 S.W.2d 325, 328 (Mo. 1979) (en banc).
48. Fair Assessment, 454 U.S. at 105-06. Although § 1983 on its face does not require
exhaustion of administrative remedies, a pending state administrative hearing is a factor that mili-
tates in favor of abstention. Id. at 136.
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agreed. 49 As stated in the syllabus to Fair Assessment, the Supreme Court,
however, held that comity alone required the federal court to abstain:
The principle of comity bars taxpayers' damages actions brought in federal
courts under 42 U.S.C. § 19830 to redress the allegedly unconstitutional
administration of a state tax system. Because the principle of comity bars
federal courts from granting damages relief in such cases, it is not neces-
sary to decide whether the Tax Injunction Act, standing alone, would bar
such actions."
While § 1341 was before the Court, the Court did not address its application
or scope. The Court did not give any reason for its decision to apply comity
as opposed to § 1341, except to note that any analysis of § 1341 was unnec-
52
essary in light of the Court's holding.
The Fair Assessment Court, unlike the Hibbs Court discussed below, did
not analyze the effect of the proposed relief on the state budget. The Fair
Assessment Court focused on the traditionally equitable nature of challenges
to state taxes, the legislative history of § 1341, and the Court's federalism
cases. 53 In particular, the Court focused on "Our Federalism" as articulated
in Younger v. Harris.54 The Court's concern was that federal courts would
meddle in purely local issues at the expense of the state's right to regulate its
own affairs." Justice Brennan, however, took a more measured view of com-
ity, noting that "the 'principle of comity' refers to the 'proper respect for
state functions' that organs of the National Government, most particularly
the federal courts, are expected to demonstrate in the exercise of their own
legitimate powers. 56 Justice Brennan argued that comity could be a wise
public policy, but not an inexorable constitutional command: "So employed,
the 'principle of comity' is nothing more than an encapsulation of policy,
49. Id. at 101-02.
50. Section 1983 was the vehicle through which the Court examined the plaintiffs' Four-
teenth Amendment claims. Id. at 106-07. The Court gave no indication that its analysis would
change had the claim been brought under another federal statute or constitutional provision. See id.
at 106.
51. Id. at 100. The Fair Assessment Court used the term "bar" throughout its decision. See
id. at 101-16. Nonetheless, federal courts still retained the right of federal constitutional review of
final state court judgments. Id. at 116 (recognizing that constitutional plaintiffs "may ultimately seek
review of the state decisions in this Court").
52. See id. at 107.
53. Id. at 116. Justice Rehnquist left the door open for a challenge to state tax laws that
were patently discriminatory: "We need not decide in this case whether the comity spoken of would
also bar a claim under § 1983 which requires no scrutiny whatever of state tax assessment practices,
such as a facial attack on tax laws colorably claimed to be discriminatory as to race." Id. at 107 n.4.
Thus, Justice Rehnquist set a high bar (i.e., capable of being invalidated with "no scrutiny what-
ever") for determining when comity would permit federal jurisdiction.
54. Id. at 112 (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971)).
55. Id. at 111.
56. Id. at 119 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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albeit policy with roots in the Constitution and our federal system of gov-
ernment."
5 7
After Fair Assessment, it is clear that comity functions independently of
§ 1341, and that it may reach further than § 1341. Hibbs, however, led
courts to question the authority of Fair Assessment. That is to say, Hibbs
indicates that comity does not reach any further than § 134 .'9
In Hibbs, the Supreme Court held that § 1341 does not deprive federal
district courts of jurisdiction when the proposed relief would increase state
tax revenue. 6° The plaintiffs brought suit in federal district court to enjoin a
state tax credit.6' The tax credit allowed taxpayers to receive a $500 credit if
they gave a donation to an organization that awarded tuition grants to stu-
dents attending private schools. 6' The plaintiffs argued that the tax credit
violated the Establishment Clause. 63 The plaintiffs were unsuccessful before
the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, which held that
§ 1341 barred federal jurisdiction,64 but were successful before the Ninth
Circuit.
61
The Supreme Court, affirming the Ninth Circuit, reasoned that § 1341
did not deprive federal district courts of jurisdiction because the state fisc
66
would not be diminished. The Hibbs Court inferred from the legislative
history that § 1341 applies only when a taxpayer sought to avoid paying
taxes. 67 In this case, no party sought to avoid paying taxes-the plaintiffs
were a third party seeking to end a tax credit given to taxpayers who made
certain charitable donations. 6' The Court further reasoned that if the law
were struck down, state tax collections would increase, and thus § 1341 did
57. Id.; see also 1 LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-30, at 589-
91 (3d ed. 2000) (arguing that the principle of comity is tied to the concept of federalism and not to
language in the Constitution or statutory law).
58. Note that the Fair Assessment Court blended its analysis of comity and federalism by
holding that comity barred jurisdiction but relying on the federalism language of Younger. Fair
Assessment, 454 U.S. at 107-11. Subsequent courts have relied on both federalism and comity to
bar jurisdiction within the context of tax litigation.
59. For further discussion of Hibbs and its application, see infra Section I.B.
60. Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 93-94 (2004).
61. Id. at 92-93.
62. Id. at 95. Before the tax credit went into effect, a different group of plaintiffs made a
similar facial challenge in the Arizona Supreme Court, which failed on a 3-2 vote. Kotterman v.
Killian, 972 P.2d 606 (Ariz. 1999) (en banc).
63. Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 93.
64. Id. at 96.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 93-94.
67. Id. at 100-07.
68. Id. at 94-95.
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not bar federal jurisdiction.69 The Hibbs Court, however, did not address
whether federalism and comity could reach beyond § 1341. 70
The Hibbs Court sidestepped Fair Assessment. The Hibbs Court cited
Fair Assessment only twice. Fair Assessment was first cited as an instance
where the federal courts lacked jurisdiction because the plaintiffs' proposed
relief would decrease state tax revenue." Fair Assessment was cited for a
second time in a footnote as an instance where plaintiffs seeking to avoid
tax liability were barred from federal court.7' The dissent criticized the ma-
jority's citation of Fair Assessment, noting that Fair Assessment stood for• • 73
broader principles. But it stopped short of arguing that comity could re-1 4
quire abstention. If Hibbs limited the reach of federalism or comity in this
context, it did so only by implication, because Hibbs did not expressly rebut
the holding of Fair Assessment. Therefore, it is an open question whether
federalism or comity can require federal courts to abstain when § 1341 per-
mits jurisdiction.
Federalism and comity can require federal courts to withhold jurisdic-
tion regardless of statutory restraints,75 because federalism and comity are
not coextensive with § 1341, and exist to protect state interests. First, the
Supreme Court undoubtedly treats federalism and comity as concepts that
76are not restrained by statutory law. Federalism, while not articulated in any
one clause of the Constitution, enjoys substantial constitutional underpin-
nings." Comity, on the other hand, does not enjoy the same sort of
69. Id. at 108 (reasoning that the relevant distinction is "between taxpayer claims that
would reduce state revenues and third-party claims that would enlarge state receipts").
70. Id. at 107. In a footnote, the Hibbs Court mentioned that comity has caused federal
courts to abstain in other instances. Id. at 107 n.9. The Court, however, did not discuss comity's
breadth. See id. Rather, the Court noted that these cases were also instances where plaintiffs sought
relief that would decrease state revenue. See id. at 106.
71. Id. at 106 (citing Fair Assessment for the claim that federal court relief is not available
where the relief requested by the plaintiff would reduce the state's tax revenue).
72. Id. at 107 n.9.
73. The dissent argued that Fair Assessment bars jurisdiction regardless of whether state
tax revenue is increased or decreased. Curiously, but plainly, Justice Kennedy did not argue that
comity barred jurisdiction independently of § 1341:
Though the majority says [Fair Assessment, among others,] supports its holding because [it]
involved plaintiffs who mounted federal litigation to avoid paying state taxes, the language of
[Fair Assessment] is too clear to be ignored and is contrary to the Court's holding today. In
Fair Assessment, the Court observed that [§ 1341] has its roots in equity practice, in principles
of federalism, and in recognition of the imperative need of a State to administer its own fiscal
operations. This last consideration was [§ 1341's] principal motivating force.
Id. at 124 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
74. See id.
75. See, e.g., 17B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
§ 4252 (3d ed. 2007) (discussing the Younger rule that provides for federal court abstention under
reasons of federalism and comity even in light of statutory law conferring federal court jurisdiction).
76. See, e.g., Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1943)
(holding, after the enactment of § 1341 and other anti-injunction statutes, that suits in equity may be
barred on the basis of comity).
77. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) ("Our Federalism").
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constitutional status; courts generally describe comity as a doctrine that
guides courts sitting in equity.78
Second, even if federalism and comity could be defined by the legisla-
ture, it is not clear that Congress intended § 1341, federalism, and comity to
be one and the same. The Congressional Record does not mention federal-
.79
ism or comity. Congress simply made a legislative judgment, pursuant to
its Article III power, to define the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal
courts. 80 Instead, the legislative history focuses on avoiding unfairness be-
tween in-state and out-of-state litigants, and avoiding interference with the
administration of the state tax system.8' Thus, while Congress intended to
restrain federal courts through § 1341, the federal courts could still restrain
themselves beyond § 1341.
Therefore, federalism and comity are concepts that exist independently
of § 1341, and courts may apply them to justify abstention even where
§ 1341 would not bar jurisdiction. This is precisely what has happened in
the Fourth and Tenth Circuits.
B. Disagreement Between the Circuits
The federal appeals courts have differed markedly over the reach of fed-
eralism and comity. The Fourth and Tenth Circuit cases hold that the
82principles of federalism and comity reach beyond § 1341. These courts
contend that the breadth of federalism and comity were "simply not before
the Supreme Court in Hibbs.' ' 3 The First, Sixth, and Seventh Circuit cases,
on the other hand, hold that Hibbs defines the limits of § 1341, comity, and
federalism.8
The Fourth Circuit, in DIRECT, Inc. v. Tolson, abstained from a case
where the plaintiffs alleged that North Carolina maintained a subsidy for
their business competitors." This subsidy imposed a significant cost on the
78. Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 119-20 (1981) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring) ("Only where a federal court [employs] its historic powers as a court of equity
... does 'comity' have an established and substantial role in informing the exercise of the court's
discretion.").
79. See H.R. REP. No. 75-1503 (1937); S. REP. No. 75-1035 (1937); 81 CONG. REC.
1415-17 (1937).
80. See Scott C. Idleman, The Emergence of Jurisdictional Resequencing in the Federal
Courts, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 38, 42 (2001) (discussing Congress's Article III power to limit
federal court jurisdiction).
81. See generally H.R. REP. No. 75-1503, at 2; S. REP. No. 75-1035, at 1-2; 81 CONG.
REC. 1416.
82. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Tolson, 513 F.3d 119, 127 (4th Cir. 2008); see Hill v. Kemp, 478
F.3d 1236, 1247 (10th Cir. 2007).
83. DIRECTV, 513 F.3d at 127; see also Hill, 478 F.3d at 1249.
84. Coors Brewing Co. v. Mdndez-Torres, 562 F.3d 3, 18 (lst Cir. 2009); Commerce En-
ergy, Inc. v. Levin, 554 F.3d 1094, 1097 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 496 (Nov. 2, 2009) (No.
09-223); Levy v. Pappas, 510 F.3d 755, 760-61 (7th Cir. 2007).
85. 513 F.3d at 128.
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plaintiffs. 86 The plaintiffs claimed that because they were an out-of-state
company, the subsidy discriminated against them in violation of the Dor-
mant Commerce Clause.87
The DIRECTV court dismissed the plaintiff's § 1983 claim, and rejected
the idea that Hibbs did anything to limit an expansive reading of Fair As-
sessment, because the comity principle is "broader than [§ 1341] itself, and
its scope is not restricted by § 1341* '8' The Fourth Circuit relied heavily on
the Supreme Court's decision in Fair Assessment to justify abstention,89 and
noted that comity "was simply not before the Supreme Court in Hibbs.' 9°
The Tenth Circuit, in Hill v. Kemp, abstained from a case where the
plaintiff argued that Oklahoma's tax scheme for license plates was unconsti-
tutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 9' The plaintiffs
contended that Oklahoma unlawfully discriminated against supporters of
abortion rights by permitting drivers to obtain license plates with the phrases
"Adoption Creates Families" and "Choose Life" for less than license plates
with pro-choice phrases.92
The Hill court attempted to limit Hibbs:
In any event, there is simply nothing in [§ 1341] or Hibbs suggesting that
federal courts can entertain challenges to state taxes on the basis of predic-
tive judgments that doing so will not harm state coffers; rather our
jurisdiction is precluded by the plain language of [§ 1341] in all cases
seeking to enjoin the levy or collection of taxes under State law.93
The Hill court then went on to sound traditional arguments in favor of a lim-
ited judiciary by writing that courts are "not authorized by Congress to be in
the business of forecasting the likely fiscal effects of variations on state tax
policy; nor ... well equipped to do so."94 Even if courts were allowed to
engage in rudimentary economic analysis, the Hill court argues, judges
should avoid "becom[ing] second rate, supply-side economists, hazarding
guesses that enjoining this or that revenue raising measure would help rather
than hurt overall tax collections.95
The Seventh Circuit, in Levy v. Pappas, created the circuit split by ab-
staining from a claim where the plaintiffs sought to avoid taxes by
invalidating a state tax scheme.96 Pursuant to Hibbs, the Seventh Circuit
86. Id. at 122-23.
87. Id. at 123.
88. Id. at 127.
89. See id. at 123-24.
90. Id. at 128.
91. 478 F3d 1236, 1239 (10th Cir. 2007).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1250.
94. id.
95. Id.
96. 510 F.3d 755, 757 (7th Cir. 2007).
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dismissed the plaintiffs' claim because the relief sought would decrease state
97tax revenue.
Although this case was a straightforward application of Hibbs, the Sev-
enth Circuit described its task as determining whether the case before it was
more like Hibbs or Fair Assessment.98 The court stated, "If the relief sought
[would operate] to reduce the flow of state tax revenue or would tie up right-
ful tax revenue, then [§ 1341] bars federal jurisdiction over the claims."99
Thus, the Seventh Circuit held, when a plaintiff alleges that the state tax is
unfair as applied to the plaintiff, then § 1341 and comity bar federal juris-
diction, as in Fair Assessment.'0° Where "a plaintiff alleges that the state tax
... is giving unfair benefits to someone else, then according to Hibbs
[§ 1341] and comity are not in play."'0'
The Seventh Circuit, therefore, defined comity, federalism, and § 1341
as having essentially the same reach. Levy does not appear to leave room for
a situation where § 1341 would permit federal jurisdiction, but comity
would bar federal jurisdiction.'02 Therefore, although the Seventh Circuit did
not take jurisdiction, this case belongs on this side of the circuit split be-
cause it finds that federalism and comity do not reach beyond § 1341.
The Sixth Circuit, in Commerce Energy v. Levin, took jurisdiction over a
claim by an out-of-state corporation doing business in Ohio. °3 The plaintiff
alleged that Ohio's tax scheme was discriminatory and thus unconstitutional
under the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses because the plaintiff's
in-state competitors benefited from tax exemptions.3 4
The district court dismissed on the grounds that federalism and comity
required abstention, even if § 1341 did not bar jurisdiction. ' 5 When
addressing the question of federalism and comity, the district court relied
on Fair Assessment and DIRECTV.'°6 The Sixth Circuit reversed and
97. Id. at 761-62.
98. ld.




103. 554 F.3d 1094, 1096 (6th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 496 (Nov. 2, 2009) (No.
09-223). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider essentially the same issues addressed by
this Note: (1) whether Hibbs narrowed the doctrine of comity applied in Fair Assessment, and (2)
whether comity principles bar federal jurisdiction in the instant case. Id. The parties' briefs indicate
that the case will likely turn on the reach of federalism and comity. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, Commerce Energy, 78 130 S. Ct. 496 (No. 09-223), 2009 WL 259938 (arguing that com-
ity's vitality ought to extend beyond Hibbs); Amicus Brief for 29 States, Commerce Energy, 130 S.
Ct. 496 (No. 09-223) 2009 WL 3052654 (arguing that Hibbs threatens the independence of state tax
administration and in favor of a broad comity principal).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1098. The Sixth Circuit wrote that the Ninth Circuit shared its view on the issue,
referencing Wilbur v. Locke, 423 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2005). Commerce Energy, 554 F3d at 1099.
Wilbur, however, is not direct support for this proposition. Wilbur involved a suit by a third party
seeking to enjoin Washington from entering into a contract with a Native American Tribe. Wilbur,
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remanded.' 7 Reasoning from Hibbs, the Sixth Circuit held that neither fed-
eralism nor comity apply where the plaintiff is a third party who seeks relief
that would increase state tax revenue.108
The Sixth Circuit distinguished Hibbs from Fair Assessment. First, the
Sixth Circuit found that "a sweeping reading of Fair Assessment" cuts
against the Hibbs Court's focus on closing the doors of federal court to
"plaintiffs [who] try to thwart tax collection."' 9 Second, a broad conception
of comity would render § 1341 redundant and unnecessary." ° Thus, the
Sixth Circuit was uncomfortable with the nonconstitutional comity principle
effectively trumping a statute."'
The First Circuit examined federalism and comity in light of Hibbs in
Coors Brewing Co. v. Mgndez-Torres."2 Coors challenged a provision in
Puerto Rico's beer taxation scheme that created a lower tax rate for small
brewers." 3 Coors brought a suit for declaratory judgment to invalidate Puer-
to Rico's taxation scheme on the grounds that it was unconstitutional under
the Commerce Clause and illegal under the Federal Relations Act." 4 The
district court found for Puerto Rico." ' The First Circuit reversed and re-
manded." '6
The First Circuit directly rebutted the Fourth Circuit's position." 7 In
Hibbs, the First Circuit noted, "Arizona similarly advanced arguments based
on principles of comity.'"' The First Circuit, however, did not explain how
the Supreme Court specifically dealt with Arizona's comity arguments." 9
The First Circuit simply read Hibbs as equating the reach of comity and
§ 1341: "[P]rinciples of comity ... preclude original federal-court jurisdic-
tion only when plaintiffs have sought district-court aid in order to arrest or
countermand state tax collection.' ' 20 The First Circuit reasoned that "Hibbs
423 F.3d at 1105. The Ninth Circuit held that the lower court erroneously dismissed the case under
§ 1341, finding that § 1341 does not apply to a prospective contract, even if the result of the contract
would have been for the State of Washington to subsequently amend its tax laws. Id. at 1110. Wilbur
discussed Hibbs, but did not take a firm position on the circuit split, and its discussion of Hibbs was
detached from its holding. See id.
107. Commerce Energy, 554 F.3d at 1096.
108. Id. at 1098.
109. Id. at 1099.
110. Id.
111. See id.
112. 562 F.3d 3, 13-18 (1 st Cir. 2009).




117. Id. at 17 ("The Fourth Circuit's position is not convincing.").
118. Id.
119. See id.
120. Id. at 17 (quoting Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 107 n.9 (2004)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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confined principles of comity to cases seeking to arrest or countermand state
tax collection."'
21
This disagreement between the circuits is the result of the Supreme
Court's failure to directly address the reach of federalism and comity in
Hibbs. Because Hibbs and Fair Assessment are not clearly reconcilable, and
federalism and comity are inherently ambiguous concepts, the federal cir-
cuits have struggled to clearly delineate their jurisdiction. To move beyond
the impasse, Part II argues that courts should begin to reason from the un-
derlying goals of federalism and comity. Part II also resolves the impasse by
identifying federalism's and comity's underlying goals and asking how
those goals are implicated in the context of suits challenging the constitu-
tionality of a state tax.
II. COURTS MUST EXAMINE THE UNDERLYING GOALS OF
FEDERALISM AND COMITY
This Part demonstrates that the federal courts on both sides of this cir-
cuit split need to address the underlying goals of federalism and comity.
Section II.A explains that failing to examine the underlying goals of federal-
ism and comity leads to an incoherent, contradictory jurisprudence. Section
II.B then examines the underlying goals of federalism and comity in this
context to conclude that federal court abstention is not justified under a fed-
eralism rationale, but that federal court abstention may be appropriate under
a comity rationale in extreme cases.
A. An Unsatisfactory Resolution:
Courts on Both Sides of the Circuit Split Should Examine
the Underlying Goals of Federalism and Comity
Scholars have long argued that courts rely on federalism and comity to
justify a particular outcome, but fail to explain how the underlying goals of1. • 122
those concepts are actually advanced through their application. Fair As-
sessment, Hibbs, and their progeny in the appeals courts suffer from that
very flaw. Courts are naturally concerned with faithfully applying precedent,
121. Id. at 18.
122. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Assumptions of Federalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1763,
1766 (2006) ("Constructing a meaningful theory of federalism must be based on these values and
not on unsupported assumptions."); Michael C. Doff, Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Delibera-
tion, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 9 (1998) (arguing that federalism should be "a flexible principle that
allows decentralized experimentation, rather than as a doctrine focused primarily on the 'dignity' of
states"); Owen M. Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103, 1118 (1977) ("But Justice Black, no less
than Justice Brennan, did not analyze, rigorously or otherwise, the underlying tenets of federalism.
He merely gave us a new shibboleth, 'Our Federalism,' to express the anti-nationalist sentiment
.... "); Mark C. Gordon, Differing Paradigms, Similar Flaws: Constructing a New Approach to
Federalism in Congress and the Court, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 187, 195 (1996) (arguing that
courts should "evaluat[e] the extent to which the underlying goals of federalism may be furthered");
Larry W. Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991, 1047 (1985) (arguing that
"federalism is a code word for routine and undifferentiated deference to the states and the state
courts in virtually any context").
March 20101
Michigan Law Review
and thus underlying policy concerns tend to go unspoken in the face of see-
mingly on-point precedent. 3 The result is a set of opinions that speaks in
terms of conclusions rather than reasons.
Examining the underlying goals of federalism and comity forces courts
to move beyond asserting federalism and comity as shibboleths, and should
help courts craft a more coherent jurisprudence.14 If courts fall into the trap
of invoking federalism and comity as if these concepts are a "brooding om-
nipresence in the sky,"' the result will be a patchwork of laws that are not
rooted in any readily identifiable purpose. Courts must begin asking pol-
icy-related questions if federalism and comity are going to function in a way
that allows concrete benefits to flow from our system of government.2 2 The
natural place to start is to ask whether the underlying goals of federalism
and comity are advanced by a decision to abstain.
B. Reasoning From the Underlying Goals of Federalism and Comity
The following discussion operates under a simple assumption: if ab-
staining does not meaningfully further the underlying goals of federalism or
comity, then federal courts should not abstain based on federalism or comity
concerns. In effect, this is a balancing test in which courts weigh the costs
and benefits of abstention.12
Federalism's primary goal is to advance liberty and avoid tyranny by
channeling power away from the federal government and to the states.
29
Courts and commentators have also identified several benefits of the federal
123. See Wilson Huhn, The Use and Limits of Syllogistic Reasoning in Briefing Cases, 42
SANTA CLARA L. REv. 813, 846 (2002) ("[Courts sometimes invoke] premises that are not proven or
explained. These are the base premises, the often unspoken assumptions of the Court's opinion.").
124. See Chemerinsky, supra note 122.
125. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) ("The common law is not a brooding
omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be
identified....").
126. See Rakesh K. Anand, Toward an Interpretive Theory of Legal Ethics, 58 RUTGERS L.
REV. 653, 673 (2006) ("The recognized truth is that the application of legal norms requires an ex-
amination of the formal rules' underlying purpose .... ").
127. Some courts and commentators might disagree with the contention that the use of
federalism and comity should rest on an analysis of whether the underlying purposes of the concepts
are furthered. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178 (1992) (O'Connor, J.) (finding
that even a compelling federal interest will not justify a significant intrusion into a state's interest).
But see Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41
UCLA L. REV. 903, 928 (1994) ("[E]ven federalism's most enthusiastic proponents, such as Justice
O'Connor, cast their arguments for federalism in functional, or policy terms.").
128. David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.YU. L. Rev. 543, 585 (1985) ("I
am concerned, however, to establish one basic proposition: that the controversy should center on the
appropriate weight to be accorded federalism considerations in the exercise of jurisdiction, not on
whether there is discretion to accord any weight at all.").
129. See J. Harvie Wilkinson 111, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95
VA. L. REV. 253, 320 (2009) (discussing "federalism's inherent capacity to protect liberty"); see
also MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 9-
12 (1988); Rubin & Feeley, supra note 127, at 927. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James
Madison).
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system of government, which include increasing public participation, broad-
ening citizen choice, fostering competition between states, and facilitating
"laboratories"'' 30 of democracy.' The underlying goals and benefits of fed-
eralism, as explained in this Section, do not provide support for depriving
the federal courts of jurisdiction over third-party suits challenging the con-
stitutionality of state tax laws.
The primary goal of comity is avoiding hostility and unnecessary fric-
tion between the federal government and state governments. 32 Avoiding
friction, as discussed below, may provide support for depriving the federal
courts of jurisdiction, at least in extreme cases. Section 1341 and Hibbs will
minimize federal-state friction in most instances because states are unlikely
to complain when their tax revenues increase. However, a situation could
arise where the relief requested by the plaintiff would increase state tax rev-
enues, but ultimately cause the state to expend a great deal of time and
energy overhauling its tax system. In such a case, substantial federal-state
friction would occur, and comity might require a federal court to abstain
despite the fact that § 1341 and Hibbs would permit jurisdiction.
1. Federalism Does Not Justify Abstention
Courts continually cite the desire to protect liberty and combat tyranny
as a primary goal of federalism. 3 3 Such a goal is virtually unassailable. The
unspoken, and often unsupported, assumption is that more state control and
130. The use of the term "laboratories" to describe states in the federal system is generally
attributed to Justice Brandeis. E.g., G. Alan Tarr, Laboratories of Democracy? Brandeis, Federal-
ism, and Scientific Management, 31 PUBLIUS 37, 38 (2001).
131. Rubin & Feeley, supra note 127, at 906-07.
132. See James C. Rehnquist, Taking Comity Seriously: How to Neutralize the Abstention
Doctrine, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1049, 1051 (1994). Courts regularly discuss comity in terms of avoiding
friction or undue interference. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (referring to
comity as "the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions
are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways"); La. Power & Light Co. v.
City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 35 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Clearly decision of this case,
in which the City itself is the party seeking an interpretation of its authority under state law, will not
entail the friction in federal-state relations that would result from decision of a suit brought by an-
other party to enjoin the City from acting."); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 335 (1943)
(Douglas, J., concurring) ("Divided authority breeds friction .... "); R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pull-
man Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941) (discussing "the friction of a premature constitutional
adjudication").
133. E.g., Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
702-03 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Federalism helps to protect liberty not simply in our mod-
em sense of helping the individual remain free of restraints imposed by a distant government, but
more directly by promoting the sharing among citizens of governmental decisionmaking author-
ity."); Clinton v. City of N.Y., 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) ("[The Framers] used the principles of
separation of powers and federalism to secure liberty in the fundamental political sense of the term,
quite in addition to the idea of freedom from intrusive governmental acts."); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) ("[T]he Constitution divides authority between federal and state
governments for the protection of individuals. State sovereignty is not just an end in itself: 'Rather,
federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.'"
(quoting Coleman v. Thompson. 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting))).
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• - 134less federal control is the best way to achieve that objective. That assump-
tion is not warranted, especially in this context.
Under the view of Hibbs espoused by the First, Sixth, and Seventh Cir-
cuits, liberty is promoted and tyranny is avoided by allowing federal
jurisdiction. The typical suit is one where the plaintiff argues that the state is
infringing basic constitutional rights (i.e., the plaintiff argues that the Due
Process, Equal Protection, or Dormant Commerce Clause is being vio-
lated).'" If a federal court exercises jurisdiction and finds for the plaintiff,
the court necessarily makes a determination that the state tax scheme was
violating some indispensable constitutional principle.136 Therefore, unless
the federal courts are somehow biased against states, or incapable of adjudi-
cating such constitutional rights,17 the exercise of federal jurisdiction will
not impede individual liberty.
One potential counterargument is that it is an affront to liberty for a fed-
eral court to effectively deprive the defendant state of access to a state
forum. Assuming a plaintiff chooses to litigate in federal court, ' the defen-
dant state is unable to have its own courts take the first bite of the apple, so
to speak.
This counterargument is not persuasive because it rests on several un-
supported assumptions. First, this counterargument assumes that it is an
advantage for the state to litigate in state court. 139 While that might be the
case, is there any reason to bend jurisdictional norms out of concern for
where the defendant prefers to litigate? To the contrary, the general rule is to
let the plaintiff have her choice of forum.' 4° Second, this argument frames
the debate in terms of the state's interest to litigate in its own forum versus
the individual plaintiff's interest in having a federal forum. Favoring the
state's interest over the plaintiff's interest does not appear to advance liberty
because federalism's ultimate goal is advancing individual liberty. Third,
134. Cf Chemerinsky, supra note 122, at 1765 (discussing seven unsupported assumptions
of the Rehnquist Court's federalism decisions). This particular assumption is not enumerated by
Professor Chemerinsky, but several closely related assumptions are listed. See id.
135. See supra Section I.B.
136. But see New York, 505 U.S. at 178 (arguing, in a distinguishable context, that even a
compelling federal interest will not justify a significant intrusion into a state's interest).
137. Indeed, the argument usually runs in the opposite direction. See supra note 27.
138. The plaintiff could bring the case in state court because state courts share concurrent
power to adjudicate constitutional claims. Anne M. Payne, Exclusive and Concurrent Jurisdiction,
20 AM. JUR. 2d Courts § 93 (2009). If the plaintiff brings the case in state court then, of course, the
defendant state has nothing to complain about.
139. This implicates the parity debate. See supra note 27. There might be support for an
argument that state governments really are better off litigating in state court. See Herbert Kritzer,
The Government Gorilla: Why Does Government Come Out Ahead in Appellate Courts?, in IN
LITIGATION: DO THE "HAVES" STILL COME OUT AHEAD? 342, 343 tbl. 11.1 (Herbert M. Kritzer &
Susan S. Silbey eds., 2003) (gathering and analyzing data from U.S. federal and state appellate
courts, and finding that state governments have a larger net advantage over other parties in state
court (+32.3) than in federal court (+11.2)).
140. 32A AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 1274 (2007) ("The plaintiff's choice of forum is to
be great given [sic] weight and should not be lightly set aside.").
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this counterargument assumes that the commonly listed benefits of federal-
ism can be obtained through abstention. As discussed below, the benefits of
federalism are not achieved by abstaining in this kind of case.
Another potential counterargument is that taxes are themselves a restric-
tion on liberty. 4 1 If a federal court takes jurisdiction and grants the relief
requested by the plaintiff, tax rates will increase. Thus, the exercise of fed-
eral jurisdiction in this class of cases restricts liberty because it implicitly
authorizes the federal courts to raise taxes.
This counterargument is not persuasive for several reasons. First, the
federal government has no financial interest in the suit. The federal govern-
ment's only interest is adjudicating a federal right-there is no scenario
where the federal government would benefit from increasing state taxes.
Second, these kinds of suits do not lend themselves to creating an oppres-
sive state tax regime, 42 because challenges to tax credits or rebates are likely
to be minuscule in the context of the state tax system. 43 Third, if state citi-
zens are concerned about an oppressive tax regime, they can exercise their
political power to lobby for a low tax rate that does not offend a federal con-
stitutional right.
Aside from furthering liberty, proponents of a highly decentralized fed-
eral system often point to several benefits of placing the bulk of
decisionmaking in the hands of state institutions. These benefits are usually
listed as increasing public participation, broadening citizen choice, fostering
competition between states, and facilitating "laboratories" of democracy.
44
From the discussion below, it is clear that these benefits should not bear
heavily on the decision to abstain.
First, these benefits come into play only when courts are faced with the
substantive (as opposed to jurisdictional) decision to strike down a state tax
law. In other words, whether these benefits are obtained depends on the out-
come of the case-these benefits are not threatened by the simple act of a
federal court hearing a constitutional challenge to a state tax. For example,
141. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 431 (1819) ("That the power to tax involves
the power to destroy; that the power to destroy may defeat and render useless the power to create;
that there is a plain repugnance, in conferring on one government a power to control the constitu-
tional measures of another, which other, with respect to those very measures, is declared to be
supreme over that which exerts the control, are propositions not to be denied."). Arguments that
taxes are antithetical to liberty persist today, but instead of making a nuanced point about the struc-
ture of government, these arguments often demonstrate a more general angst. See Thousands of
Anti-Tax 'Tea Party' Protesters Turn Out in U.S. Cities, FOXNEws.CoM, Apr. 15, 2009,
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/04/15/anti-tax-tea-party-protests-expected/ (quoting protest-
ers who carried signs saying "Give me liberty, not debt"). In fairness, not all opposition to increased
taxes is merely angst; many proponents of low taxes frame their arguments in moral and ethical
terms. E.g., Daniel J. Mitchell, The Moral Case for Tax Havens, CATO @ LIBERTY, Oct. 22, 2008,
http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/2008/10/22/the-moral-case-for-tax-havens/.
142. See supra Section I.B (discussing cases that arise out of due process and equal protec-
tion challenges).
143. Of course, a situation could arise where the challenged tax was substantial. That does
not appear to be the situation given the cases previously considered by the federal circuit courts. See
supra Section I.B.
144. Rubin & Feeley, supra note 127, at 914.
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consider the scenario presented in the Introduction. If the federal court de-
cides to hear the plaintiff's challenge to the constitutionality of the state tax
credit, the state's ability to serve as a laboratory of democracy is not
harmed, because the federal court has not yet passed on the merits. Only
once the state tax credit is invalidated can it be claimed that the federal court
has hampered the state's ability to experiment. Conversely, if the federal
court hears the case but decides that the state tax credit is constitutionally
permissible, then the state's ability to experiment is not stifled.
4 1
Even if a federal court merely exercising jurisdiction implicates federal-
ism's underlying goals, it is unlikely that those underlying goals would
actually be furthered by abstention. Federal court abstention in this context
does not advance federalism's goals of public participation, citizen choice,
competition, and experimentation.
Courts sometimes note that federalism improves the democratic process
• 146
by increasing the opportunity for local political involvement. Federalism
can increase the opportunity for citizens to affect the democratic process
because states are closer to the people.44 The assumption is that people find
it easier and more convenient to influence their local government.148
Public participation, however, is not a persuasive argument for absten-
tion. First, public participation in the judicial process is not necessarily
desirable. 49 For example, as Justice O'Connor recently noted, the justice
system can be marred by judicial elections that permit expensive campaign
contributions and encourage majoritarian decisions at the expense of minor-
ity rights. 50 Second, this goal is more suited to a legislative or regulatory
context where public participation is generally encouraged.1 5' Thus public
145. Advocates of expansive federal court jurisdiction might argue that one reason to prefer
federal court over a state court is that the federal court is more sensitive or more protective of fed-
eral constitutional rights. See, e.g., Neubome, supra note 3, at 1105-06 (discussing the parity
debate). This Note, however, argues that federal court jurisdiction is justified regardless of whether
federal and state courts are in parity.
146. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
147. Calvin Massey, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 431, 541-43
(2002) (discussing the assumptions of the public-participation argument); Rubin & Feeley, supra
note 127, at 915-16 (evaluating the public-participation justification for federalism).
148. Massey, supra note 147.
149. See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Chief Justice, Wisconsin Supreme Court, The Ballot and
the Bench, Address at the Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. Lecture on State Courts and Social Justice
(Mar. 15, 2000), in 76 N.YU. L. REV. 973, 978 (2001) ("Scholars, lawyers, and bar associations
have been nearly unanimous in condemning judicial elections.").
150. Jennifer Sullivan, Ex-Justice O'Connor: Electing judges puts courts at risk, SEATrLE
TIMES, Sept. 15, 2009, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.comhtmllpolitics/2009866692
justicel5m.html.
151. Ernest Gellhorn, Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE L. J.
359, 371-72 (1972) (arguing that the value of public participation is likely to be higher in legislative
or quasi-legislative government functions than in judicial or quasi-judicial government functions).
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's most recent, and sweeping, federalism decisions came in the
context of curtailing federal legislative power. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 555
(1995) (invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 based, in part, on federalism concerns);
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178 (1992) (invalidating the "take title" provision of the
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act based, in part, on federalism concerns).
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participation is not meaningfully advanced by federal court abstention in
this context.
Commentators often argue that federalism increases the overall utility
function of the citizenry.52 States offer different bundles of tax systems and
government services.53 People can "vote with their feet" to find the state
with the tax-services ratio that best suits their preferences.1
4
Citizen choice, however, is not a compelling justification for abstention.
First, federal restrictions on state tax schemes do not create a uniform na-
tional tax code. Federal restrictions would set only the outer limit of
acceptable state behavior. States are still free to create a unique bundle of
taxes and services. Second, scholars have long recognized that the ability to
vote with one's feet should not vitiate fundamental constitutional rights.'55
Third, the federal courts have a role in restraining a potential tyranny of the
majority.56 The more homogenous a state becomes, the more likely that
state is to favor policies that benefit the majority at the expense of the ever-
dwindling minority. In the context of suits challenging the constitutionality
of a state tax credit, federal courts-by virtue of having appointed judges-
might be more likely to push back against an overwhelming majority. 57
Commentators argue that competition between states forces states to
create the best economic climate to attract businesses."' This is closely re-
lated to the "citizen choice" argument, but this argument emphasizes states
competing to have businesses locate within their borders. ' 9 This argument
has a bit more punch than the citizen-choice argument because businesses
are more likely to respond to the legal-economic climate in a state. In oth-
er words, if a business recognizes that Nebraska has lower taxes than Iowa,
that business might move to Nebraska.1
61
152. Rubin & Feeley, supra note 127, at 918.
153. Id.
154. See Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights under Federalism, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
147, 150 (1992) ("Federalism works best where it is possible to vote with your feet."). The efficacy
of voting with one's feet is subject to harsh scholarly critique. Rubin & Feeley, supra note 127, at
918 ("Climate, size, location, employment opportunities, and a variety of other factors are likely to
loom larger in the utility function of our wandering citizen, even apart from considerations that
discourage mobility, like family ties, nostalgia, and local loyalty.").
155. Douglas Laycock, Voting with Your Feet Is No Substitute for Constitutional Rights, 32
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 29, 30 (2009).
156. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
157. Whether federal courts really are more likely to stand up for minority rights is a central
area of disagreement in the parity debate. See supra note 4.
158. Rubin & Feeley, supra note 127, at 920-21.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See id. Some scholars have argued that this phenomenon creates a harmful "race to the
bottom." William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE




The state-competition argument should still receive very little weight in
the decision to abstain. First, states are free to compete in a wide variety of
ways, states just are not allowed to compete by playing fast and loose with
constitutional rights.16 Second, clear federal rules will create fairer competi-
tion between the states. If each state is playing within the same boundaries,
no state will be able to benefit from a particularly controversial tax scheme.
This is the laboratories-of-democracy argument. When states have a
wide degree of latitude to enact different policies, the nation can observee • 163
which policies are most effective. Justice Brandeis described this process
as "one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."'6 Thus, it
might be argued that federal jurisdiction over challenges to state tax credits
will hamper the ability of states to conduct beneficial experiments from
which the rest of the country might learn something useful.
Striking down a state tax credit on federal constitutional grounds, how-
ever, will not meaningfully diminish experimentation. Placing constitutional
limits on state tax laws is analogous to placing ethical limits on scientific re-
search. Even if a scientist can yield interesting and useful results from an
experiment, ethics may limit her options; yet the scientist may still perform
other versions of the experiment. In the same way, the Constitution places
limits on the ability of states to experiment, but does not ban experimentation.
Therefore, federalism is not a justification for federal court abstention
from third-party constitutional challenges to state tax credits. First, federal-
ism's primary goal, advancing liberty, is not achieved by abstention. Second,
the benefits of federalism, as discussed above, are not realized by abstention.
2. In Extreme Cases, Comity May Justify Abstention
Comity, in the context of third-party suits challenging state tax schemes,
should operate to bar federal jurisdiction only in rare cases in which exercis-
ing jurisdiction would create unbearable tension between the state and
federal governments. Comity seeks to minimize harmful friction between
sovereigns. 6- Given comity's rather vague goal, a very case-specific inquiry166 Hib17168
is a necessity. The rule in Hibbs"' will prevent tension in most cases. A
162. See Laycock, supra note 155, at 30-31 ("[Vioting with your feet is often a last resort
in response to illegitimate treatment.... [T]he debate over the appropriate scope of [constitutional]
rights cannot be resolved by references to voting with your feet.").
163. Rubin & Feeley, supra note 127, at 923.
164. New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Rubin and Feeley, in refuting Justice Brandeis's argument, note that experimentation is more the
result of managerial decentralization than of federalism. Rubin & Feeley, supra note 127, at 924.
165. See Rehnquist, supra note 132, at 1052.
166. Shapiro, supra note 128, at 583 (arguing that the complexity of the federal system
makes it impossible to craft a hard-and-fast rule regarding comity).
167. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
168. Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 108-09 (2004).
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case may arise, however, that requires a federal court to deeply intrude into
the realm of state sovereignty. In such cases, federal courts should abstain.
The Hibbs rule will satisfy the goals of comity in most cases because
damaging friction between the state and federal governments is unlikely to
occur when a federal court improves the state's bottom line. At least two
prominent judges appear to agree with this conclusion. Judge Easterbrook of
the Seventh Circuit observed, "The legislative history is filled with concern
that federal judgments were emptying state coffers and that corporations
with access to the diversity jurisdiction could obtain remedies unavailable to
resident taxpayers. There was no articulated concern about federal courts'
flogging state and local governments to collect additional taxes."'' 69 Judge
Friendly concurs: "Congress was thinking of cases where taxpayers were
repeatedly using the federal courts to raise questions of state or federal law
going to the validity of the particular taxes imposed upon them...."170
Both Judge Easterbrook and Judge Friendly were describing the legisla-
tive history of § 1341, but their reasoning is equally persuasive in the
context of comity. Judge Easterbrook alludes to the understanding that state
and local governments will not need to be coerced into collecting additional
taxes. Even if the state government begrudges having a federal court tell it
what to do, the state government will certainly be comforted by additional
tax revenue. Thus, in the typical case, where the rule in Hibbs is satisfied,
the goal of comity is also met because friction between the state and federal
governments will be minimized.
The rule in Hibbs will apply in the vast majority of cases. Challenges to
the constitutionality of a state tax credit tend to focus on specific, narrow tax
schemes.'7 ' In other words, federal courts are not likely to see claims where
the plaintiff alleges that the entirety of the state's tax code is systemically
biased against a particular group. Typical suits involve a credit to an in-state
corporation' or a credit for donations to certain charitable groups. 73 In
these kinds of cases, the offending tax credit is easily identifiable, and the
effect of invalidating it will clearly increase state tax revenue. Thus, in the
typical suit, federal courts will not be required to rewrite the state's tax code
or engage in any other highly fractious remedy.
Federal courts could, in extreme cases, be asked to grant a revenue-
increasing remedy that is likely to create a great deal of friction between the
federal and state governments. For example, assume that a plaintiff claims
that the state's entire tax code is systemically biased against her socio-
economic group, but that the tax code should be rewritten in such a way as
to ultimately increase state tax revenue. If a federal court was presented with
this kind of case, the rule in Hibbs would likely permit jurisdiction because
169. Dunn v. Carey, 808 F.2d 555, 558 (7th Cir. 1986).
170. Wells v. Malloy, 510 E2d 74, 77 (2d Cir. 1975).
171. See supra Section I.B.
172. E.g., Commerce Energy, Inc. v. Levin, 554 F.3d 1094, 1095-96 (6th Cir.), cert.
granted, 130 S. Ct. 496 (Nov. 2, 2009) (No. 09-223).
173. E.g., Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 92-93.
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the plaintiff's requested relief would increase state tax revenue. Nonetheless,
this example would be an appropriate place to invoke comity. If the federal
court were to grant jurisdiction and approve the plaintiff's relief, the federal
court would in effect be requiring the state legislature to go back to the
drawing broad. Even if the federal court did not invalidate the entire tax
code, the federal court would likely need to carefully excise or add provi-
sions to the state's tax code. In either case, federal intrusion is far more
significant than in the typical case described above. Thus comity may justify
abstention in such an extreme case.
The Supreme Court's precedent supports using comity to bar jurisdiction
in extreme cases. Justice Brennan explained as follows:
While the "principle of comity" may be a source of judicial policy, it is
emphatically no source of judicial power to renounce jurisdiction. The ap-
plication of the comity principle has thus been limited to a relatively
narrow class of cases: Only where a federal court is asked to employ its
historic powers as a court of equity, and is called upon to decide whether to
exercise the broadest and potentially most intrusive form of judicial au-
thority, does "comity" have an established and substantial role in
informing the exercise of the court's discretion.1
4
Having established that comity may reach beyond § 1341 to bar federal
jurisdiction in extreme cases, a question remains as to how to draw the line
between the typical case and the extreme case. As noted above, such a ques-
tion is necessarily a highly fact-specific inquiry that does not lend itself to a
bright line rule. 75 Courts should consider at least two factors, including (1)
the degree of certainty as to whether tax revenue will actually increase, and
(2) the administrative burden that the proposed relief would impose on the
state. 116
This is a middle-of-the-road solution. The Fourth and Tenth Circuits de-
fined comity as a broad, powerful concept that could be readily invoked in177
many cases. The First, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits essentially held that
comity goes no further than § 134 1,17 which essentially guts the notion of
comity as an independent, equitable concept. 79 To give effect to the underly-
ing goal of comity, it is sufficient to follow the Court's holding in Hibbs in
174. Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 119-20 (1981) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring) (second emphasis added) (footnote call number omitted). Commentators have
also argued that comity can bar jurisdiction in extreme cases. See Rehnquist, supra note 132 at
1066-68 (discussing when and why comity should cause courts to abstain); Shapiro, supra note 128
at 585 (arguing that federalism and comity are justifications for abstention).
175. Shapiro, supra note 128 at 583.
176. See id. for several other factors to consider when abstaining on comity grounds, in-
cluding disruption of ongoing state court proceedings, degree to which federal constitutional rights
are implicated, the prospect of managing-taking over state institutions, and the ability of state courts
to recognize and enforce constitutional rights.
177. See supra Section I.B.
178. See supra Section I.B.
179. See generally Shapiro, supra note 128, at 570-74 (discussing the long common law
history of comity dating back to Great Britain).
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nearly every case. Cases may arise, however, where it is necessary to abstain
even when state tax revenues might increase. In such cases, the relief re-
quested by the plaintiff would cause the federal court to radically alter or
interfere with the state's tax system. Forcing the state to revamp its tax
scheme is likely to create substantial friction and thus violate the underlying
goal of comity.
CONCLUSION
To answer the question presented in the beginning of this Note, federal
courts may abstain from actions permitted by § 1341 and Hibbs only in ex-
treme cases. Extreme cases are instances where comity concerns
significantly outweigh any benefit to be gained from exercising jurisdiction,
because the proposed relief would result in an extraordinary intrusion into
the state's tax system.
Returning briefly to the hypothetical presented in the Introduction, the
federal court should not abstain from the plaintiff's challenge to the state's
tax credit program. First, the plaintiff is seeking to invalidate a tax credit,
and thus § 1341 and Hibbs permit jurisdiction, because the state's tax reve-
nue will likely increase if the plaintiff wins. The state could argue, however,
that the state budget would actually be harmed because students and fami-
lies would lose the incentive to attend private schools. The actual effect on
the state budget could lend itself to complex litigation, but given the relative
simplicity of the tax credit, courts would likely be able to determine the ac-
tual effect of the tax-credit program. Second, the Introduction's hypothetical
does not qualify as an extreme case. The tax credit is a single provision in
the tax code, and thus it does not appear to be intertwined with other tax
provisions. Therefore, the federal court could invalidate the tax credit with-
out causing the state to drastically alter its system of tax administration. Of
course, if the facts were tweaked to make the tax-credit program more inte-
gral to the overall tax system, the case for abstention based on comity
concerns would improve.
As even this brief analysis indicates, the task of determining federal ju-
risdiction over constitutional challenges to state tax schemes can be highly
fact specific. Nonetheless, by examining the facts, and the underlying rea-
sons for why a federal court might abstain, courts will begin to craft a more
thoroughly reasoned federalism and comity jurisprudence that will create
more fairness and consistency.
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